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Behavior in spatial navigation is often organized into map-based (place-driven) vs. map-free
(cue-driven) strategies; behavior in operant conditioning research is often organized into
goal-directed vs. habitual strategies. Here we attempt to unify the two. We review one
powerful theory for distinct forms of learning during instrumental conditioning, namely
model-based (maintaining a representation of the world) and model-free (reacting to
immediate stimuli) learning algorithms. We extend these lines of argument to propose
an alternative taxonomy for spatial navigation, showing how various previously identified
strategies can be distinguished as “model-based” or “model-free” depending on the
usage of information and not on the type of information (e.g., cue vs. place). We argue that
identifying “model-free” learning with dorsolateral striatum and “model-based” learning
with dorsomedial striatum could reconcile numerous conflicting results in the spatial
navigation literature. From this perspective, we further propose that the ventral striatum
plays key roles in the model-building process. We propose that the core of the ventral
striatum is positioned to learn the probability of action selection for every transition
between states of the world. We further review suggestions that the ventral striatal core
and shell are positioned to act as “critics” contributing to the computation of a reward
prediction error for model-free and model-based systems, respectively.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A vast morass of neuroscience data addresses the problem of
how voluntary behavior is underpinned by the anatomical and
physiological substrates of the forebrain. Principles or frame-
works to organize this data are essential. A consensus is growing
around the potentially useful organizing principle that we can
make a division of the forebrain striatum into three domains
on both anatomical (Joel and Weiner, 1994, 2000; Voorn et al.,
2004) and functional (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Yin et al., 2008;
Bornstein and Daw, 2011; Ito and Doya, 2011; van der Meer et al.,
2012) grounds. From this “striatal eye-view” we can make sense
of the wider cortical, hippocampal, amygdala, and basal gan-
glia networks in which they sit, and the role of these networks
in different forms of voluntary behavior. Both the spatial nav-
igation and instrumental conditioning literatures have adopted
this perspective, recognizing the functional division of striatum
into dorso-lateral (DLS), dorso-medial (DMS), and ventral stria-
tum (VS) 1, belonging to different parallel cortico-basal ganglia
loops (Alexander et al., 1990; Middleton and Strick, 2000), with
each striatal domain having established functional roles within
those broader behavioral distinctions. How do these functional
1We use VS throughout, rather than nucleus accumbens, to emphasize the con-
tiguous nature of the striatum through its dorsolateral to ventro-medial extent
(Voorn et al., 2004; Humphries and Prescott, 2010).
distinctions map between the two literatures? And what might we
learn by comparing the two?
While some links have been drawn between the approaches
of the two literatures (Redish, 1999; Yin et al., 2004, 2008;
Khamassi, 2007), their primary theories for the strategies under-
pinning behavior are, we suggest, orthogonal: the conditioning
literature distinguishes goal-directed and habitual behavior in a
task, whereas the navigation literature distinguishes place and
response strategies for solving a task. However, there is mount-
ing evidence that the place/response distinction is unable to
account for the effects of lesions on navigation behavior. Our
main hypothesis is that strategies for navigation, similar to strate-
gies for instrumental conditioning (Daw et al., 2005), can be
reconciled as either model-free or model-based—we define these
terms below. At root, the key distinction is that it is the use
of information in building a representation of the world, rather
than the type of information about the world, that defines the
different computational processes and their substrates in the
striatum. We argue that explicitly identifying the DLS as a cen-
tral substrate for model-free learning and expression, and the
DMS as a central substrate for model-based learning and expres-
sion (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Thorn et al., 2010; Bornstein
and Daw, 2011; van der Meer et al., 2012) can help rec-
oncile numerous conflicting results in the spatial navigation
literature.
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With this hypothesis in hand, we can see how work on spatial
navigation gives us a second hypothesis, useful to understanding
instrumental conditioning. We propose that the VS is a central
substrate—in collaboration with the hippocampus—for a collec-
tion of functions that we informally term the “model-builder”. On
the one hand, the core of the VS acting as the locus of actions
necessary to build a model; and on the other hand the shell of
the VS acting to evaluate predicted and achieved outcomes in the
model. These are clearly not the only roles of the multi-faceted
VS (Humphries and Prescott, 2010); nonetheless, they may prove
a further useful organizing principle.
With this sketch in mind, we address first the different forms
of behavioral strategies that have separately been identified in the
spatial navigation and instrumental conditioning literatures. We
take a striatal-centric view here as an organizing principle, not
as a claim that striatal domains are exclusive substrates for dif-
ferent forms of learning and navigation. Each striatal domain is
one locus in a broader basal ganglia network that computes its
output using information gathered by the striatum (Houk and
Wise, 1995; Mink, 1996; Redgrave et al., 1999; Humphries et al.,
2006; Leblois et al., 2006; Girard et al., 2008); and each network
is in turn one locus in a broader basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical
loop. Nonetheless, the striatum’s consistent intrinsic microcir-
cuit across the dorsolateral to ventro-medial axis (Bolam et al.,
2006), its integration of cortical, thalamic, hippocampal, and
amygdala input, and its position as the primary target of the mid-
brain dopaminergic system, makes it a natural vantage point from
which to attempt to unify the disparate strands of navigation and
conditioning.
2. STRATEGY DISTINCTIONS IN SPATIAL NAVIGATION
2.1. TAXONOMY OF SPATIAL NAVIGATION FORMS
Evidence for different navigation strategies in the rat comes from
behavioral studies showing that they are able to rely on differ-
ent information to localize themselves in the environment and
to reach a certain location in space (Krech, 1932; Reynolds et al.,
1957; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). Existing classifications of naviga-
tion strategies (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Gallistel, 1990; Trullier
et al., 1997; Redish, 1999; Franz and Mallot, 2000; Arleo and
Rondi-Reig, 2007) point out a series of criteria, some of them
overlapping, to differentiate navigation strategies: the type of
information required (sensory, proprioceptive, internal), the ref-
erence frame (egocentric vs. allocentric), the type of memory at
stake (procedural vs. declarative memory) and the time necessary
to acquire each strategy (place-based strategies generally being
more rapidly acquired than cue-guided strategies; Honzik, 1936;
O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Packard and McGaugh, 1992, 1996;
Redish, 1999). Moreover, it has been observed that in normal ani-
mals, a shift from a place strategy to a response strategy occurs
in the course of training (Packard, 1999). This has led to the
proposition of a strong distinction between two main categories
of strategies:
• Response strategies, where a reactive behavior results from
learning direct sensory-motor associations (like heading
toward a visual cue or making an egocentric turn at the cross-
roads of a maze). This category includes target-approaching,
guidance, cue-guided, and praxic 2 navigation, and can be
further elaborated in the form of a sequence or chaining of
Stimulus-Response (S-R) associations when new cues result
from the previous displacement (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978;
Trullier et al., 1997; Arleo and Rondi-Reig, 2007).
• Place strategies, which rely on a spatial localization process,
and can imply a topological or metric map of the environ-
ment (Tolman, 1948)—the termmap being defined by Gallistel
(1990) as “a record in the central nervous system of macro-
scopic geometric relations among surfaces in the environment
used to plan movements through the environment”.
2.2. SUBSTRATES IN THE STRIATUM
This strong strategy distinction has been mapped onto a strong
distinction in underlying neural systems. It has been found
that lesions of the hippocampal system impair place strate-
gies while sparing response strategies (Morris, 1981; Packard
et al., 1989; Devan and White, 1999). In contrast, lesions
of the DLS produce the opposite effect: impairing or reduc-
ing the expression of response strategies while sparing place
strategies (Potegal, 1972; Devan and White, 1999; Adams
et al., 2001; Packard and Knowlton, 2002; Martel et al.,
2007). Thus, it is common to speak of place and response
strategies as being, respectively, “hippocampus-dependent” and
“hippocampus-independent” (White and McDonald, 2002).
Some theories propose that the “hippocampus-dependent” sys-
tem expresses its output via the VS (Redish and Touretzky,
1997; Albertin et al., 2000; Arleo and Gerstner, 2000; Johnson
and Redish, 2007; Penner and Mizumori, 2012). Other studies
have also highlighted a role for the DMS in the “hippocampus-
dependent” system (Whishaw et al., 1987; Devan and White,
1999; Yin and Knowlton, 2004), by finding that lesions of the
DMS promote response strategies, implying the loss of place
strategies. The behavioral strategies are often equated directly
with learning systems: that is, separate systems that learn a partic-
ular cue-guided and/or place-guided set of strategies for a given
environment. However, the simple mapping between VS-DMS
vs. DLS onto place vs. response strategies is not consistent with
mounting evidence from lesion studies.
2.3. KNOWN PROBLEMS WITH TAXONOMY AND SUBSTRATES
Response strategies are not solely dependent on the DLS. Chang
and Gold (2004) reported that DLS-lesioned rats were only
unable to express a response strategy on a T-maze in the absence
of extra-maze cues; in cue-rich conditions the DLS-lesioned rats
did not differ from controls in their ratio of using response
or place strategies. Both Yin and Knowlton (2004) and De
Leonibus et al. (2011) also found no significant decrease in the
use of response strategies by DLS-lesioned rats running a T-maze.
Moreover, Botreau andGisquet-Verrier (2010) not only replicated
this result but also ran a second separate cohort of DLS-lesioned
rats to confirm it; further, they showed that the DLS-lesioned
rats using a response strategy were really doing so: they con-
tinued to use that strategy to solve a new task on the T-maze.
2praxic normally refers to internally-generated sequences of movement
independent of position information.
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We conclude that the response learning system—including cue-
guided and praxic strategies—cannot be simply associated with
the DLS.
Place strategies are not solely dependent on the DMS. When
learning to navigate to a hidden platform in the Morris water
maze, rats with DMS lesions were able to learn the platform’s
location just as well as controls or DLS-lesioned rats, as indicated
by their similar escape latencies (Whishaw et al., 1987; Devan
and White, 1999); consistent impairment—shown by a lack of
improvement over trials—only occurred if the fornix-fimbria 3
was cut (Devan and White, 1999). Botreau and Gisquet-Verrier
(2010) reported that DMS-lesioned rats did not differ from con-
trols or DLS-lesioned rats in their ratio of using response and
place strategies in a probe test in the water-maze. We conclude
that the place learning system cannot be simply associated with
the DMS.
The precise role of VS in particular navigation strategies is
even less clear (see Humphries and Prescott, 2010; Penner and
Mizumori, 2012 for recent reviews). VS lesions impair place-
based learning (Sutherland and Rodriguez, 1989; Ploeger et al.,
1994; Setlow and McGaugh, 1998; Albertin et al., 2000). For
instance, lesions of the medial shell of the VS impair the rat in
learning and recalling the location of sites associated with larger
rewards (Albertin et al., 2000). However, more recent studies
reveal that VS function may not be restricted to place strategies.
For instance, De Leonibus et al. (2005) report that VS lesions
impair the acquisition of both allocentric and egocentric strate-
gies in a task requiring the detection of a spatial change in the
configuration of four objects placed in an arena.
The clean distinction between rapidly learnt place strate-
gies and slowly learnt response strategies is also problematic.
Several authors have reported rapidly learned response strate-
gies (Pych et al., 2005; see Willingham (1998) and Hartley and
Burgess (2005) for reviews including rodent data). Conversely,
while place strategies have most of the time been found highly
flexible and more rapidly acquired than response strategies
(Packard and McGaugh, 1996), after extensive training place
strategies can also become inflexible and persist in leading
animals toward the previous goal location after a reversal, as
if not relying on a cognitive map (Hannesson and Skelton,
1998; see also rat behavioral data in a Y-maze described in
Khamassi, 2007).
These data suggest that the simple distinction between place
vs. response strategies might be too broad to explain the dif-
ferent roles of VS-DMS vs. DLS in navigation. Several authors
have highlighted that this classification of navigation strategies
lends too much importance to the type of information involved
(i.e., place vs. cue) and thus to the spatial localization process
(Trullier et al., 1997; Sutherland and Hamilton, 2004). We suggest
that considering the type of learning involved—and measurable
in terms of behavioral flexibility—might better account for the
specific involvement of VS, DMS, or DLS in navigation. To see
3This fiber pathway brings hippocampal information to the VS, but is also
the source of brainstem inputs to the hippocampus, so may disrupt either
transmission of place information by hippocampus or the encoding of place
in hippocampus.
this, let us first consider the taxonomy of learning in instrumental
conditioning.
3. STRATEGY DISTINCTIONS IN INSTRUMENTAL
CONDITIONING
3.1. GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIORS vs. HABITS
A long line of conditioning research has elaborated two oper-
ationally defined forms of instrumental behavior in the rat:
goal-directed in which the animal is able to modify its behavior
in response to changes in outcome and habitual in which the
animal does not respond to changes in outcome (it perseveres
with its previous action— hence “habit”) (Dickinson, 1985; Yin
et al., 2008). This definition is “operational” because it can only be
safely defined in retrospect— i.e., after extinction. Experimenters
typically use a test in extinction to discriminate between these
two behavioral modes after a reward devaluation or change in
contingency between behavior and reward. If during this extinc-
tion test the animal quickly stops producing the now irrelevant
conditioned response (e.g., pressing a lever) it is said to be goal-
directed; if the animal persists it is said to be habitual (Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998). The inference is then drawn that goal-directed
animals have access to action-outcome contingencies to guide
behavioral choice, and that changes in outcome consequently
change action choice, whereas habitual animals make behavioral
choices based on S-R pairings (Dickinson, 1985).
3.2. SUBSTRATE EVIDENCE FOR DMS’ GOAL-DIRECTED AND DLS’
HABITUAL ROLES IN LEARNING
During the course of a conditioning task animals’ behavior pro-
gressively shifts from expressing awareness of action-outcome
contingencies to expressing habits. In particular, after extensive
training or overtraining animals’ behavior is most often habitual
(Yin et al., 2004). It turns out that this natural progressive shift can
be perturbed by lesions of different parts of the striatum, point-
ing to a possible double-dissociation between DLS and DMS: the
former being required for acquisition and maintenance of habits,
and the latter being required for learning and expression of goal-
directed behaviors (Balleine, 2005; Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Yin
et al., 2008).
There is a strong consensus that the dorsolateral striatum is
necessary for habitual behavior: lesions of either the DLS (Yin
et al., 2004), or disruption of dopamine signaling within it (Faure
et al., 2005), prevent habit formation in extinction. Animals
with such lesions thus appear to maintain goal-directed behav-
ior throughout a task. Correspondingly, there is a re-organization
of the DLS’ single neuron activity during habit formation (Barnes
et al., 2005; Tang et al., 2007; Kimchi et al., 2009). Consequently,
the dorsolateral striatum has been proposed as central to the
learning of habits (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Yin et al., 2008).
There is a strong consensus that the dorsomedial striatum is
necessary for goal-directed behavior: lesions of the DMS (Yin
et al., 2005b), or blockade of NMDA receptors within it (Yin
et al., 2005a), putatively preventing synaptic plasticity, prevent
sensitivity to devaluation or contingency changes in extinction.
Animals with such lesions thus appear to obtain habitual behav-
ior from the outset. Correspondingly, there is a re-organization of
the DMS’ single neuron activity after changes in action-outcome
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 79 | 3
Khamassi and Humphries Model-free/model-based navigation strategies
contingencies (Kimchi and Laubach, 2009; Kimchi et al., 2009).
Consequently, the dorsomedial striatum has been proposed as
central to goal-directed learning (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Yin
et al., 2008).
A caveat is that the anterior part of DMS (aDMS) may escape
from this functional scheme. To our knowledge, only the pos-
terior DMS (pDMS) has been clearly shown as involved in the
acquisition of goal-directed behaviors (Yin et al., 2005b) and
in place-based navigation (Yin and Knowlton, 2004). Lesions of
aDMS do not affect either of these processes. They even increase
the number of rats classified as place-responders both during
initial and late phases of learning (Yin and Knowlton, 2004),
and seem to increase the sensitivity to contingency degradation
(compared to sham-lesioned rats) (Yin et al., 2005b). Ragozzino
and Choi (2004) showed that inactivating aDMS does not affect
learning of a T-maze task or acquisition of a place strategy; but
inactivation during reversal learning did affect performance, thus
suggesting that aDMS is involved in switching between strate-
gies, not in learning per se. Contrary to these data, Moussa et al.
(2011) showed that a rat’s impairment in learning an alternating-
arm T-maze task correlated with volume of DMS damage, not
with the location of the lesion. Nonetheless, it remains possi-
ble that the aDMS is not part of the goal-directed or habitual
systems.
3.3. THE VENTRAL STRIATUM IN CONDITIONING
While dorsal parts of the striatum are important for the expres-
sion of learned S-R contingencies, their acquisition may require
intact VS (Atallah et al., 2007). The VS is indeed located at a
crossroads between limbic and motor structures which places
it in a privileged position to integrate reward, motivation, and
action (Mogenson et al., 1980; Groenewegen et al., 1996). In the
instrumental conditioning literature, the VS is also considered
particularly important for Pavlovian influences over voluntary
behavior (Balleine and Killcross, 1994; Dayan and Balleine, 2002;
Yin et al., 2008; van der Meer and Redish, 2011). It has been
attributed roles as both a locus of Pavlovian conditioning—
learning to associate outcomes to different stimuli or states—and
the locus of Pavlovian-instrumental transfer—the use of those
learnt stimulus-outcome associations to motivate the learning
and expression of instrumental actions in the presence of those
stimuli (Yin et al., 2008). Further, while the functional subdivi-
sion of VS into core and shell might be oversimplified (Heimer
et al., 1997; Ikemoto, 2002; Voorn et al., 2004; Humphries and
Prescott, 2010), it may account for distinct influences of reward
values on habitual performance and goal-directed behavior,
respectively. For instance, Corbit and Balleine (2011) found that
shell lesions impair outcome-specific [putatively goal-directed
as noted by Bornstein and Daw (2011)] Pavlovian-instrumental
transfer while core lesions impair general (putatively habitual)
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.
These data suggest that the differences in the learning pro-
cess controlling the progressive influence of rewards on actions
may determine the functional roles of striatal domains in var-
ious behavioral strategies: DLS being involved in learning and
expression of habitual behaviors; DMS being involved in learn-
ing and expression of goal-directed behaviors; VS controlling the
influence of reward values on these two processes during learning.
Computational work has brought great advances in formalizing
the differences between these learning processes.
3.4. MODEL-BASED vs. MODEL-FREE LEARNING PROCESSES
Machine-learning research into formal algorithms for reinforce-
ment learning has developed a basic distinction between two
forms of such algorithms. Common to both is the idea that we
can represent the world as a set of states S, that the agent could
take one of a set of actions A in each state (including no action
at all), and that the outcome of taking action a in state s is the
next state s′ and a possible reward r (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Distinguishing the two is whether or not the dependencies in the
world representation are explicitly modeled (Figure 1).
In the model-free forms of algorithm, each state has associ-
ated with it a distribution of the values of each possible action,
learnt iteratively using a prediction error to minimize the dif-
ference between the values of actions in consecutive states. This
set includes most well-known forms of reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms—including Temporal Difference (TD) learning,
Actor-Critic, and Q-Learning. Each state thus has an associated
distribution of cached action-values Q(s, a) over all available
actions. The action to execute is then simply chosen based on this
cached value distribution. Such behavior is called reactive in that
it is state-driven—e.g., stimulus-driven—and does not rely on the
inference of possible outcomes of the action.
In the model-based forms of algorithm, direct use is made
of the state information about the world. With each state s is
still associated a reward r, each action is still assigned a value
Q(s, a), and action selection is based on those values. However,
model-based algorithms explicitly store the state transitions after
each action: they can then simulate off-line the consequence
of action choices on transitions between states before choosing
the next action appropriately (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Johnson
and Redish, 2005). Thus in this case the agent will infer pos-
sible future outcomes of its decisions before acting. In simple
decision-making tasks in which each action leads to a different
state, such a process is naturally captured by a branching decision
tree (Figure 1); in more natural situations states may be re-visited
during ongoing behavior, and thus the transitions between states
may have periodic structure. Sophisticated model-based algo-
rithms explicitly compute a separate transition matrix T(s′, a, s)
for the probability of ending up in each next state s′, given the
current state s and each possible action choice a in A (Daw et al.,
2005, 2011; Glascher et al., 2010).
Daw et al. (2005) proposed the formal mapping that goal-
directed behavior results from model-based learning and that
habitual behavior results from model-free learning 4. They fur-
ther proposed that both learning systems operate in parallel, with
4They used a model-based algorithm that explicitly computed the transi-
tion matrix. It seems feasible that simpler model-based algorithms, without
explicit computation of the transition matrix, could also equally account for
the sensitivity to devaluation and contingency changes in goal-directed learn-
ing, as their repeated internal simulation after such outcome manipulations
would result in more rapid changes in overt behavior. To our knowledge, no
one has examined the possibility. Intriguingly, Johnson and Redish (2005)
showed that such an internal-simulation model, emulating hippocampal
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FIGURE 1 | Model-based and model-free learning and controllers.
Model-based and model-free controllers represent the world as a set of
states S1 . . .Sm and actions A1 . . .AN within those states. They learn the
values of each action in a given state, here indicated by the thickness of each
circle, based on available rewards R. What distinguishes them is their
representation of the links between those states. A model-based controller
(centre) also represents the transitions between states and the action(s) that
cause the transition (indicated by the multiple arrows). For a known current
state, specified by current sensory information, the model can be traversed
to find the likely outcome of simulated actions in each state—one such
trajectory is given by the orange arrows. Each trajectory can then be used to
update the predicted value of each action. Finally, after a number of
trajectories through the model, an overt action is selected based on their
updated values in the current state. A model-free controller (right) vastly
reduces the representational and computational demands by essentially
externalizing the world-model. Sensory information specifies the state at
time t1; an action is chosen based on its current value. Updated sensory
information resulting from that action then specifies the state at time t2.
Learning is then based on the prediction error between expected and
resulting values of the action taken at t1. A model-free controller can also be
trained by a model-based controller, and thus represent an abstraction of that
model. Irrespective of whether model-free or model-based, a common set of
information needs to be learnt to construct and use the controller (left) to
specify the set of current relevant states in the world; to learn actions
available within them and the transitions those actions cause; and to learn
the reward function—which state(s) contain reward(s).
the system chosen for current behavioral control based on hav-
ing the least uncertainty in its prediction of the outcome. Using
stylized examples of simple conditioning tasks, they showed how
this mapping can explain the sensitivity to devaluation and con-
tingency degradation in extinction early in training when the
model-based controller is dominant, and how that sensitivity is
lost when themodel-free controller becomes dominant with over-
training. The underlying explanation is that the model-based
controller directly represents action-outcome contingencies, and
is thus able to quickly propagate changes in reward through the
world-model; by contrast, the model-free controller, while able
to reduce the uncertainty in its predictions with over-training,
requires further extensive training for the change in reward to
propagate through the independent state-action representations.
This formal mapping onto computational substrates has proven
a very useful and fruitful guide to the understanding of these
operationally-defined forms of behavior and their inferred learn-
ing systems (Ito and Doya, 2011; Bornstein and Daw, 2011;
van der Meer et al., 2012).
This computational mapping is also assumed to follow the
same substrate mapping (Daw et al., 2005; Bornstein and Daw,
replay of previous trajectories through a maze, could indeed reduce the onset
of habit-like stereotypy in the paths taken through the maze.
2011; Ito and Doya, 2011). Thus, as DLS is central to the
habit-learning system, so, by extension, it is considered central
to the model-free learning system in instrumental conditioning
(Daw et al., 2005). Similarly, as DMS is central to the goal-
directed system, it is thus natural to propose that DMS is central
to the model-based learning system in instrumental conditioning
(Bornstein and Daw, 2011).
4. UNIFICATION: NAVIGATION STRATEGIES ARE
MODEL-FREE OR MODEL-BASED
Superficially, the model-free/model-based dichotomy strongly
resembles the dichotomous taxonomy defined in the spatial
navigation literature between flexible map-based place strate-
gies and automatic map-free response strategies. However, the
two approaches are orthogonal: one is defined by information
use in a world representation (model-free/based), the other by
information type (place/cue).
Our hypothesis is that we may similarly distinguish model-
free and model-based navigation strategies by their use of
information (Figure 2), no matter if the state is represented
by a spatial location or a visual stimulus. Within these two
top-level strategies, we may further differentiate strategies
defined by their reference frame and modality of processed
stimuli:
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Acon selecon process
Inﬂexible, slow to acquire
(S-R associaons)
Flexible, rapidly learned
(cognive graph)
Strategy
dimension
Place Place strategies
Cue Response strategies
A
Acon selecon process
Inﬂexible, slow to acquire
(model-free)
Flexible, rapidly learned
(model-based)
Strategy
dimension
Place Place strategies(PRTR)
Place strategies
(map-based)
Cue Response strategies(habitual)
Response strategies
(goal-directed)
B
FIGURE 2 | New taxonomy of navigation strategies based on
model-based/model-free reinforcement learning. (A) Previous
taxonomies highlight the distinction between flexible rapidly acquired
map-based strategies and inflexible slowly acquired S-R strategies.
(B) New taxonomy highlighting model-free and model-based place
strategies as well as model-free and model-based response strategies.
PRTR, place-recognition triggered response strategies as classified by
Trullier et al. (1997).
• egocentric reference frame, relying on idiothetic (praxic), or
allothetic (cue-guided) stimuli;
• allocentric reference frame, relying on idiothetic and/or allo-
thetic stimuli (places).
Our hypothesis thus naturally extends to proposals for the striatal
substrates of model-free and model-based strategies in naviga-
tion: that the DLS is central to the model-free navigation system
and DMS is central to the model-based navigation system.
This combined conceptual (model-free vs. model-based) and
substrate (DLS vs DMS) hypothesis raises four implications that
each explain some troubling or inconsistent data for the place vs.
response dichotomy in navigation. First, that we can conceive of a
model-free strategy based on place information alone supported
by the DLS. Second, that, correspondingly, we can conceive of a
model-based “response” strategy based on cues alone supported
by the DMS. Third, that, following the model-based/model-free
mapping in conditioning (Daw et al., 2005), model-based and
model-free control of navigation could be distinguished behav-
iorally by whether or not the animal reacts to changes in the
value or contingencies of rewards, and by lesions to the DLS and
DMS. Fourth, that both place and cue information should be
available to both the model-based and model-free navigation sys-
tems, and thus should be detectable within both the DMS and
DLS. We consider each of these in turn, then discuss the key
role of the hippocampal formation as the likely source of state
information.
4.1. DLS AND (MODEL-FREE) PLACE STRATEGIES
Model-free navigation strategies based on place information
alone have been called “Place-Recognition Triggered Response
(PRTR)” strategies by Trullier et al. (1997) who emphasized that
such a strategy produces inflexible behavior because it needs to re-
learn sequences of place-response associations in case of a change
in goal location. This type of learning was prominent in early
models of hippocampus-dependent navigation (Burgess et al.,
1994; Brown and Sharp, 1995; Arleo and Gerstner, 2000; Foster
et al., 2000).
Following the same DLS vs. DMS double-dissociation logic as
was used for goal-directed and habitual learning then, if DMS
is the substrate for place strategies, lesions of the DMS should
impair place strategies and lesions of the DLS should not affect
them. However, there is evidence against this dissociation and
indirect evidence in favor of a place strategy supported by DLS.
Lesions of the DMS slow but do not prevent the learning of a
hidden platform in a water maze, which putatively requires a
place-based strategy (Devan andWhite, 1999). More compelling,
Botreau and Gisquet-Verrier (2010) tested control, DLS-lesioned,
and DMS-lesioned rats learning a hidden platform water maze
task; after learning, a probe trial was used where the rats were
started in a different location for the first time: they found that
rats were divided into the same ratio of “place” and “response”
groups on the probe trial irrespective of whether they were con-
trol, DLS-lesioned, or DMS-lesioned rats. Recently, Jacobson et al.
(2012) tested rats on an alternating strategy plus-maze, which
required the use of either a response-based or place-based strat-
egy on each trial as signaled by an extra-maze cue: they found
that post-training DLS lesions impaired use of both the response
and place strategies. Thus, there is evidence that intact DLS is
important for using place strategies.
4.2. DMS AND (MODEL-BASED) RESPONSE STRATEGIES
The proposal of a model-based response strategy is just the claim
that we can conceive of states in a spatial navigation task as
being defined by the position of intra- or extra-maze cues rel-
ative to the animal. In such a model, different states would not
necessarily correspond to different spatial position. Rather, we
can conceive of an example task where distinct states s1 and s2
correspond to the same spatial location and differ on whether
a light is turned on or off. Then a model-based system can
learn the transitions between these states and search the model
to proceed with action selection—e.g., reward may be delivered
only when the light is on. Thus, whereas others have explic-
itly identified a response strategy—e.g., a strategy guided by the
light—with habitual behavior (e.g., Yin and Knowlton, 2004), we
are proposing that the two are orthogonal.
Again we may follow the same double-dissociation logic: if
DLS is the sole substrate for response strategies, then lesions of
the DLS should impair response strategies and lesions of the DMS
should not affect them. There is evidence against this dissoci-
ation, and in favor of DMS involvement in response-strategies.
As noted in section 2.3, lesions of the DLS do not impair the
use of response strategies on probe trials, suggesting that intact
DMS is sufficient to support the use of response strategies (Chang
and Gold, 2004; Yin and Knowlton, 2004; Botreau and Gisquet-
Verrier, 2010; De Leonibus et al., 2011). Chang and Gold (2004)
further reported that the DLS lesions only effectively impaired the
use of response strategies when there were no extra-maze cues.
This suggests that model-based (and putatively DMS-based) use
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of cues was sufficient to maintain a response strategy in the cue-
rich conditions; but that a model-free (and putatively DLS-based)
praxic response strategy was necessary in the cue-deficient condi-
tions (that is, in the absence of sufficient cues, learning a sequence
of turns was required).
Moussa et al. (2011) tested the effects of DLS and DMS lesions
on the ability of rats to learn a return-arm T-maze in which the
rats were required to alternate their choice of visited arm (left or
right) to obtain reward, but were free to run at their own pace.
The task is a seemingly simple response strategy but requires a
minimal model to achieve rewards above chance level. At the
choice point of the T-maze, a model-free learning system would
assign equal value to turning left or turning right as both would
be rewarded on (approximately) half the visits. To achieve better,
a minimal model would be needed to at least link the previ-
ous choice of arm to the current choice, chaining at least two
(state, action) pairs in a loop—which corresponds to a model-
based process. Moussa et al. (2011) found that DMS lesions, and
not DLS lesions, impaired learning of this task irrespective of
the amount of training. Their data thus suggest a model-based
response strategy role for DMS.
4.3. VALUE-SENSITIVITY IN NAVIGATION AND ITS ALTERATION BY
DMS BUT NOT DLS LESIONS
If the prediction of Daw et al. (2005) is correct, then model-based
and model-free control of action can be distinguished behav-
iorally by whether or not the animal reacts to changes in the value
or contingencies of rewards. Thus, under our hypothesis, such
sensitivity to value or contingency changes in spatial navigation
should be reflected in both place and response strategies if using
a model-based controller and in neither place nor response strat-
egy if using a model-free controller. Similar to the goal-directed to
habitual transfer observed in instrumental conditioning (Yin and
Knowlton, 2006), we might expect that this outcome sensitivity
would disappear with over-training on a sufficiently determinis-
tic task, reflecting the transfer from amodel-based to amodel-free
controller for navigation. Also similarly, our hypothesis is that this
transfer is from the DMS to the DLS-based systems; so lesions
to those systems should differentially affect how changes in value
subsequently change behavior.
Whereas above we reviewed evidence in favor of their breaking
the place vs response dichotomy, here we consider evidence more
directly in favor of the association of DMS with a model-based
system and DLS with a model-free system. De Leonibus et al.
(2011) recently provided intriguing evidence from devaluation in
favor of both (1) the existence of model-based and model-free
response strategies and (2) their dissociable modulation by DMS
and DLS lesions. Further, Moussa et al. (2011) provided evidence
from extinction during navigation for both. We consider these
studies in turn.
Figures 3A,B outlines De Leonibus et al. (2011) dual-solution
plus-maze task and experimental design. Key to the design was
separately training “early” and “late” groups of rats for, respec-
tively, 26 and 61 days before the first probe trial, which established
the strategy they were using to locate the reward (Figure 3B).
Both “early” and “late” groups preferentially used the response
strategy on the first probe trial (Figures 3C,F), replicating earlier
results (Devan and White, 1999; Yin and Knowlton, 2004).
However, the response strategy sub-group for both “early” and
“late” were then split, with approximately half receiving a devalu-
ation regime for the food reward in the maze. On the subsequent
second probe trial, only the “early” group showed awareness of
the devaluation, through a significant drop in their use of a
response strategy (Figure 3D). There was no change in the use
of response strategy by the devalued “late” group (Figure 3G).
Thus, while both “early” and “late” groups of rats preferentially
used a response strategy, only the early group modified use of
that strategy after change in the value of reward, evidence of a dis-
tinction between a model-based and model-free form of response
strategy.
De Leonibus et al. (2011) then separately tested the effects
of pre-training sham and DMS lesions on a new “early” group,
and of pre-training sham and DLS lesions on a new “late” group.
They found that the DMS lesion prevented the devaluation from
changing the proportion of “early” group rats using a response
strategy (Figure 3E). This is consistent with the loss of DMS pre-
venting value updates from propagating through themodel-based
system. Conversely, they found that the DLS lesion now permit-
ted the devaluation to change the proportion of “late” group rats
using a response strategy (Figure 3H). This is consistent with the
loss of DLS preventing transfer to the model-free system, and
subsequently value updates continued to propagate through the
model-based system. Together, these results support the double
dissociation of DMS as part of a model-based and DLS as part of
a model-free system for navigation.
Moussa et al. (2011) found results consistent with this pic-
ture from rats tested in extinction on a navigation task. As noted
above, they tested rats on an alternating arm T-maze task, thus
requiring rats to maintain a memory of the previously visited
arm. As the rats ran at their own pace, Moussa et al. (2011) were
unusually also able to test the effects of extinction on navigation
tasks by leaving the arms unbaited in the final 10-min session.
They found that control rats did decrease their laps of the maze
over the 10-min period, so that extinction effects were detectable.
Moreover, though DLS lesions had no effect on learning the task,
they did lead to significantly faster extinction of maze running.
These data are thus consistent with lesions of DLS removing the
putative model-free navigation substrate, thus leaving intact the
putative model-based substrate in DMS that was subsequently
faster to respond to the outcome devaluation.
4.4. PLACE AND CUE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO BOTH
MODEL-BASED AND MODEL-FREE SYSTEMS
If the DLS and DMS are indeed, respectively, substrates for
model-free and model-based navigation systems, and not the
response and place systems, then cue- and place-based correlates
of movement should appear in the activity of both.
DLS activity is consistent with the development of cue-based
correlates of movement. Jog et al. (1999) showed that develop-
ing DLS activity over the course of a T-maze task stabilized to
just the start and end positions in the maze once the rats had
reached operationally “habitual” behavior. van der Meer et al.
(2010) showed that decoding of position information from dorsal
striatal activity consistently improved over experience, and that its
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FIGURE 3 | Evidence for model-based and model-free navigation in data
reported by De Leonibus et al. (2011). (A) Dual-solution plus-maze task
used by De Leonibus et al. (2011). On training trials, rats always start from
the same arm (south) and have to learn the location of the reward in a
consistently baited arm (e.g., east). After training, a probe trial starting in the
opposite arm is used to ascertain the rat’s strategy for locating the reward
(a food pellet): a “response” strategy based on direction of turn, or a “place”
strategy based on location of reward with respect to extra-maze cues.
(B) The experimental design of De Leonibus et al. (2011). Rats were in two
broad categories, designated “early” and “late” with respect to the first
probe trial (day 27 or day 62). All “response” rats from that trial were taken
forward to the second stage, and split approximately evenly into devaluation
and control (value) groups. Both groups had free access to food pellet reward
for 15 min immediately after training for each of five days; the devaluation
group received an injection of LiCl immediately afterwards, the control group
received a saline injection. The devaluation group developed a taste aversion
to the pellets, but no reduction in completed trials (De Leonibus et al., 2011).
(C–E): data from “early” group; (F–H) data from the “late” group.
(C) Proportion of “early” group rats using each strategy on first probe trial.
(D) From the second probe trial, the proportion of rats continuing to use a
“response” strategy after devaluation compared to controls. (E) From the
second probe trial, the proportion of rats continuing to use a response
strategy after devaluation and pre-training DMS lesion, compared to controls
for both. (F) Proportion of “late” group rats using each strategy on first probe
trial. (G) From the second probe trial, the proportion of “late” group rats
continuing to use a “response” strategy after devaluation, compared to
controls. (H) From the second probe trial, the proportion of rats continuing to
use a response strategy after devaluation and pre-training DLS lesion,
compared to controls for both. An ∗ indicates a significant difference of at
least p < 0.05—see De Leonibus et al. (2011) for details.
activity peaked only at choice points in the maze, consistent with
a slow learning model-free system that learnt to associate differ-
entiable intra-maze states with actions (Graybiel, 1998; Yin and
Knowlton, 2006). DLS activity is also selectively correlated with
position: Schmitzer-Torbert and Redish (2008) found that dorso-
lateral striatal electrophysiological activity correlated with place
when the task required knowledge of spatial relationships, but no
correlation when the task was non-spatial.
DMS is clearly in receipt of place information in that activity
is correlated with actions or rewards in particular locations, but
not correlated with the location alone (Wiener, 1993; Berke et al.,
2009). Furthermore, lesions of posterior DMS prevent execution
of place-based strategies (Yin and Knowlton, 2004) as does loss of
dopamine from that region (Lex et al., 2011). Its input from the
prefrontal cortex (PFC), particularly medial PFC which receives
considerable direct input from the CA1 place cells, is one of the
most likely sources of place information; there is clear evidence
that medial PFC supports place representation [e.g., Hok et al.
(2005)]. Nonetheless, there is also evidence for DMS’ receipt of
cue-information. Devan and White (1999) reported that asym-
metric lesions (unilateral hippocampus and contralateral DMS)
produced mild retardation of acquisition of both cue-based and
place-based learning. Correspondingly, recording studies report
that the largest changes in DMS neural activity occur in the
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middle stages of learning during cue-guided (both with auditory
and tactile cues) navigation (Thorn et al., 2010).
4.5. HIPPOCAMPAL INPUT TO MODEL-BASED AND MODEL-FREE
SYSTEMS
For spatial navigation the primary candidate for generating the
states and the relationship between them is the hippocampal for-
mation. Although hippocampus has been largely associated with
spatial encoding (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978), it could be more
broadly involved in learning (and planning in) a model or graph
of possible transitions between states, no matter if these states
are spatial or not (van der Meer et al., 2012). Consistent with
this, hippocampal place cells are also sensitive to non-spatial
information (e.g., the presence of a certain object or the color
of the walls), this non-spatial information modulating or re-
mapping the place representation (Wiener et al., 1989; Redish,
1999). Similarly, hippocampal place cells re-map on maze tasks
following a change of context, such as the change of rewarded
arm in a plus-maze (Smith and Mizumori, 2006). Thus, within
our proposal, the role of the hippocampus would be both to sup-
ply spatial information to a model-free system and to contribute
to a model-based system by building the model—in interaction
with the VS as argued later—and planning actions within this
model. This view is similar to ideas that the hippocampus pro-
vides contextual information to some aspects of learning such as
contextual fear conditioning (Rudy, 2009) and spatial planning
information to other aspects of learning (Banquet et al., 2005;
Hasselmo, 2005; Dollé et al., 2010; Martinet et al., 2011). It is also
similar to points made by Redish and Touretzky (1998) that one
can both store sequences and do location-recall in hippocampal
attractor networks without interfering with each other (see also
Redish, 1999).
Consequently, lesions of the hippocampus should affect both
model-free and model-based systems through loss of spatial
information, but transient interference with its activity should
affect only the model-based system through loss of the use of the
model. Figure 4 illustrates how our proposition may account for
the recent results obtained by Jadhav et al. (2012). In this study,
rats experienced aW-track spatial alternation task: they alternated
between “inbound” trials where they had to go to the center start-
ing from either the left or the right arm and “outbound” trials
where they had to go from the central arm to the arm (left or
right) that they did not visit on the previous trial (Figure 4A).
Outbound trials present a higher degree of difficulty in that they
require linking past experience—the previously experienced side
of the maze—with current location in order to make an appropri-
ate decision. Strikingly, lesion of the hippocampus impaired both
inbound and outbound learning (Kim and Frank, 2009) while
disruption of awake hippocampal replay only impaired outbound
learning (Jadhav et al., 2012).
We show on Figure 4B (resp. C) how a model-free (resp.
model-based) system dependent on hippocampal input could
explain the results. A model-free system learning the association
between a spatial state (i.e., left arm, right arm, or central arm)
A
B
C
FIGURE 4 | Model-based/model-free framework applied to a spatial
alternation task requiring both inbound and outbound learning.
(A) W-shaped maze experienced by rats, adapted from Kim and Frank (2009).
Hippocampal lesions impair both inbound and outbound learning (Kim and
Frank, 2009) while disruption of awake hippocampal replay only impairs
outbound learning (Jadhav et al., 2012). (B) A model-free system associating
places with actions can learn inbound trials but would face high uncertainty
during outbound trials. (C) A model-based system associating previous
transitions with actions can associate past experience with current location
and is thus able to learn both inbound and outbound trials.
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and an action would be able to learn inbound trials but not
outbound trials. This is because the “center” state is half of the
time followed by rewarded trials on the left and half of the
time followed by rewarded trials on the right, thus producing a
situation with high uncertainty. In contrast, a model-based sys-
tem learning to associate previous state transitions with actions
can solve both inbound and outbound trials (Figure 4C). Thus,
within our proposal, hippocampal lesions impair both inbound
and outbound learning because they suppress spatial information
required by both place-based model-free and model-based sys-
tems. By contrast, disruption of hippocampal awake replay would
impair only the model-based system, potentially by blocking the
storage of transitions in the model (Gupta et al., 2010), sparing
the model-free system to still learn inbound trials.
5. VENTRAL STRIATUM—MODEL BUILDER?
What, then, might be the role of the VS in model-free and model-
based navigation? Ventral striatal recordings and lesion studies
have provided strong evidence for an evaluative role, either as
part of the “critic” contributing to the calculation of the reward
prediction error (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Khamassi et al., 2008),
or as the locus for general Pavlovian-instrumental transfer where
rewarded stimuli act to motivate future action (Corbit et al., 2001;
Yin et al., 2008; Corbit and Balleine, 2011). The actor/critic archi-
tecture is a variant of the model-free reinforcement algorithms,
which conceptually splits the value learning and action selection
components (Sutton and Barto, 1998): the critic learns the value
of every state, and uses those values to compute the reward pre-
diction error after each state transition s to s′, given any reward
obtained; the prediction error is used by the actor to change
the probability of selecting each action in state s, thus reflecting
the outcome. The existing evidence that dorsal striatum supports
action selection while the VS supports stimulus-outcome asso-
ciation has led to proposals that they respectively subserve the
actor and critic roles (Joel et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004;
Khamassi et al., 2005, 2008; Daw et al., 2011; van der Meer and
Redish, 2011). The primary candidate for transmitting the reward
prediction error is the phasic activity of the midbrain dopamine
neurons (Schultz et al., 1997; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Cohen
et al., 2012); further strengthening the proposed identification of
the VS with the critic is that it is the major source of inputs to
the dopamine neurons (Watabe-Uchida et al., 2012) that in turn
project to the dorsal striatum (Maurin et al., 1999; Haber et al.,
2000) (see Figure 6).
We sketch an account here that finesses this view, extending
previous proposals (Yin et al., 2008; Bornstein and Daw, 2011)
for separately considering the core and shell. We first argue that
in addition to being useful for the “critic” in model-free pro-
cesses, reward information encoded by the VS also contributes
to model-based processes such as the building of a reward func-
tion. Second, from the perspective of navigation tasks, we find
evidence that the core of the VS is a key locus for learning the
correct sequences of actions in a task. A useful consequence of
considering this proposed model-based/model-free dichotomy in
both conditioning and navigation is that, whereas the core of
the VS is often ascribed a purely evaluative role in the con-
ditioning literature (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Yin et al., 2008;
Bornstein and Daw, 2011), the literature on core involvement
in navigation clearly points to a major role in the direct con-
trol of locomotion. For the shell of the VS, we discuss further
the suggestion that it is a key locus of the critic that signals the
reward prediction error for the model-based system (Bornstein
and Daw, 2011)5; we also discuss the possibility that it acts
as a critic that signals a state prediction error in the predicted
and actual state transitions. As these functions of the core and
shell are essential for correct assemblage of the “model” of
the world, we informally label the VS as part of the “model-
builder”.
5.1. VENTRAL STRIATUM AS SUBSTRATE FOR BUILDING THE REWARD
FUNCTION
In the machine learning literature, one of the requirements for
model-based algorithms is to build the so-called “reward func-
tion” which relates states to rewards [see Figure 1; (Sutton and
Barto, 1998)]. In spatial tasks, this consists of memorizing the
places in which reward is found. This is crucial information
for deliberative decision-making where inference of future out-
comes within the estimated world model—e.g., the tree-search
process—requires reaching a terminal state where a reward can
be found. The reward function is also important for off-line
simulations within the world model to consolidate trajectories
leading to reward—see for instance theDynaQ algorithm (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). Indeed, such mental simulations should be
informed when the agent has virtually reached a state contain-
ing a reward, although the agent is not necessarily physically
experiencing such reward.
Interestingly, sequences of hippocampal place cell activations
that occur while an animal is running a track in search for reward
are known to be replayed during subsequent sleep (Euston et al.,
2007) or during awake resting periods (Foster and Wilson, 2006;
Gupta et al., 2010). These replay events have been hypothesized to
participate in the consolidation of relevant behavioral sequences
that lead to reward. Of particular interest for this review are recent
reports of off-line synchronous replay between ventral striatal and
hippocampal activity (Lansink et al., 2009). Lansink et al. (2009)
found pairs of hippocampus—VS neurons that were reactivated
during awake fast forward replay preferentially if: the hippocam-
pal cell coded for space, the ventral striatal cell coded for reward,
and the hippocampal cell was activated slightly before the ventral
striatal cell during the task. The reactivation occurred 10 times
faster than the sequence of activity during the task execution, pos-
sibly complying with physiologically plausible eligibility timing.
The ventral striatal cells were predominantly in the core—but
also included the shell. By illustrating possible neural mecha-
nisms for the off-line consolidation of place-reward associations,
these results provide striking examples of activity that could
underly the building of the “reward function”, which relates states
to rewards.
5This relates to the notion, in the machine learning literature, that some
model-based algorithms such as Dyna-Q can update their state-action values
through a reward prediction error (RPE), although other model-based algo-
rithms based on so-called value iteration processes do not rely on a RPE: they
instead propagate value information from each state to other proximal states
(Sutton and Barto, 1998).
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Of course, it is plausible that such replay events could at the
same time be used to update value estimations and action proba-
bilities in the model-free system, consistent with the hypothesized
critic role of part of the VS (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Khamassi
et al., 2008; Bornstein and Daw, 2011). But if the ventral stri-
atal part engaged during these replay events was only dedicated to
model-free reinforcement learning, all ventral striatal cells encod-
ing reward predictions in any location—not only in the reward
location—should be reactivated in correspondence with the hip-
pocampal cells coding for their associated states, which is not
the case here. These results thus emphasize that the VS’s eval-
uative role and its involvement in encoding reward information
may also contribute to model-based processes. In support of this
view, McDannald et al. (2011) recently showed in rats experi-
encing an unblocking procedure that VS not only incorporates
information about reward value but also about specific features
of the expected outcomes. Along with the orbitofrontal cortex, VS
was indeed found to be required for learning driven by changes in
reward identity, information only relevant for model-based pro-
cesses but not for model-free ones which only work with value
information.
Now where does the information which is replayed off-line
between VS and hippocampus come from? One possibility is
that relevant place-reward associations experienced during task
performance are tagged in order to be preferentially replayed
during subsequent sleep or awake resting periods. In support of
this proposition, van der Meer and Redish (2010)’s synchronous
recordings of VS and hippocampus in a T-maze disentangled pos-
sible mechanisms underlying the binding of hippocampal place
representations and ventral striatal reward information during
task performance. They found a ventral striatal phase precession
relative to the hippocampal theta rhythm. This phase precession
was found in ventral striatal rampneurons preferentially receiving
input from those hippocampal neurons that were active lead-
ing up to reward sites. This phenomenon was accompanied by
increased theta coherence between VS and the hippocampus, pos-
sibly underlying the storage of relevant place-reward associations
that should be tagged for subsequent consolidation.
5.2. VENTRAL STRIATAL CORE AS SUBSTRATE FOR BUILDING THE
ACTION MODEL
Yin et al. (2008) proposed that one of the core’s primary functions
is to learn stimulus-outcome associations that drive preparatory
behavior such as approach. Bornstein and Daw (2011) proposed
in turn that, as preparatory behavior is value-agnostic, this is con-
sistent with the core playing the role of the critic in a model-free
controller: that it either computes directly or conveys the values
of current and reached state to midbrain dopamine neurons (Joel
et al., 2002), which in turn signal the reward prediction error to
targets in the striatum and PFC (Schultz et al., 1997; Dayan and
Niv, 2008). This proposal naturally extends to the core playing the
role of model-free critic in navigation as well as conditioning.
However, it is equally clear that the core has a role in direct
control of motor behavior, and may even serve as an action selec-
tion substrate separate from the dorsal striatum (see Pennartz
et al., 1994; Nicola, 2007; Humphries and Prescott, 2010 for
reviews). These dual roles for the core are not in conflict: the
separate populations of core neurons that either project to the
dopaminergic neurons of the midbrain or project to the other
structures of the basal ganglia could, respectively, fulfill the eval-
uative and motor control roles (Humphries and Prescott, 2010).
Here we focus on how the latter role may fit into a putative model-
based/model-free separation of navigation based on the dorsal
striatum.
It has long been known that core application of NMDA,
AMPA, or dopamine agonists, or of drugs of abuse
(amphetamine, cocaine), induces hyperlocomotion in rats,
and that intact output of the core through the basal ganglia is
necessary for this hyperlocomotion to occur (Pennartz et al.,
1994; Humphries and Prescott, 2010). The phasic activity of indi-
vidual core neurons also correlates with the onset of locomotion
during self-administration of cocaine (Peoples et al., 1998).
During behavioral tasks, the activity of individual neurons in
the core correlates with the direction of upcoming movement,
irrespective of the properties of the cue used to prompt that
movement (Setlow et al., 2003; Taha et al., 2007). Moreover,
when rats navigate a maze, the activity of core neurons correlates
with the direction of movement in specific locations (Shibata
et al., 2001; Mulder et al., 2004). Together, these data suggest that
the core not only directly controls movement, but also receives
spatial information on which to base that control.
In addition, the core is necessary for correctly learning
sequences of motor behaviors. Blocking NMDA receptors in
the core, which putatively prevents synaptic plasticity, degrades
performance on many spatial tasks: rats cannot learn paths to
rewards (Kelley, 1999), learn spatial sequences (in this case, of
lever presses) to achieve reward (Bauter et al., 2003), or locate a
hidden platform in a Morris water maze when encoded by dis-
tal cues alone (Sargolini et al., 2003). Lesioning hippocampal
afferents to VS by cutting the fornix/fimbra pathway results in
numerous spatial navigation problems. Whishaw and colleagues
have shown that rats with such lesions have intact place responses,
but great difficulty in constructing paths to them (Whishaw et al.,
1995; Gorny et al., 2002). In a Morris water maze, lesioned rats
can swim to a pre-lesion submerged platform location, but not
to a new one (Whishaw et al., 1995); in open-field exploration,
lesioned rats do not show path integration trips to their homebase
(Gorny et al., 2002). Data from these studies has to be interpreted
with care, but are consistent with the NMDA blockade studies.
Together these data point to a key role for ventral striatal core in
linking together sequential episodes of behavior.
So what is the motor control part of the core doing within
the model-based/model-free framework? A general proposition
is that the core is the route via which hippocampal sequencing of
states reaches themotor system, a finessing of the long-recognized
position of the core at the limbic-motor interface (Mogenson
et al., 1980). We sketch a proposal here that its specific compu-
tational role is to learn and represent the probability of action
selection within the transition model of the model-based system.
5.2.1. Actions in the transition model
Consider the transition model T(s′, a, s), giving the probabil-
ity of arriving in state s′ given action a and current state s;
which we can also write p(s′|a, s). The model has two uses: for
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off-line learning, it is used to sample trajectories through the
world model, and update the values of each state accordingly
(Sutton and Barto, 1998; Johnson and Redish, 2005); for on-line
action selection, it can be queried for the probability that each
action will lead to the desired transition from state s to s′. To
achieve this dual use it might be advantageous to decompose
the transition model p(s′|a, s) using Bayes theorem into repre-
sentations of the state transitions and of the probability of action
selection:
p(s′|a, s) = p(s′|s)p(a|s
′, s)
p(a|s) ,
where we assume that current state s is known. The first-term
p(s′|s) is then just the probability model for state transitions, the
second term is just the probability p(a|s′, s) that each action will
cause that transition, normalized by the probability p(a|s) of ever
taking that action in state s. Consequently, off-line learning is a
product of the two terms, whereas on-line action selection can be
based on the second term only.
Such a decomposition in turn suggests a decomposition into
neural substrates. The hippocampal formation has long been
proposed to represent potential state transitions (Poucet et al.,
2004), and so is a natural candidate for representing p(s′|s) in the
simultaneous activity of current (s) and adjacent (s′) place cells.
Alternatively, neural network modeling of hippocampal forma-
tion functions in spatial navigation has even suggested that the
directional-specificity of many place fields could be interpreted
not as place cells but rather as “transition” cells, representing the
possible transitions between the current and next “states” in the
environment (Gaussier et al., 2002). In this account, each cell is a
candidate for directly encoding p(s′|s).
The ventral striatal core is then a potential substrate for repre-
senting the transition-conditioned probability of action selection
p(a|s′, s). A plausible network implementation is that hippocam-
pal outputs representing s and s′ converge on neuron groups
in the core, whose consequent activity is then proportional to
p(a|s′, s). Learning this action component p(a|s′, s) of the tran-
sition model is then equivalent to changes in the synaptic weights
linking the two state representations in hippocampus to the neu-
ron group in the core. Over all known state transitions from the
current state s, the activity in the core then encodes a probability
distribution over potential actions; the selection of action based
on this distribution is then done by the core’s corresponding basal
ganglia circuit (see Redgrave et al., 1999; Nicola, 2007; Humphries
and Prescott, 2010; Humphries et al., 2012 for detailed models of
this process).
This decomposition into substrates suggests that core neurons
should thus show activity correlated with both off-line model
search and on-line action selection. The latter we have already
discussed: core activity is correlated with specific actions; in par-
ticular, the studies of Shibata et al. (2001) and Mulder et al.
(2004) showing a set of core neurons with motor-related activ-
ity only in specific places within a maze (such as an arm),
and then only when the rats move in a particular direction
in that place (e.g., toward the arm end), are consistent with
the encoding of action probability conditioned on a transition
between states. This substrate decomposition also suggests that
hippocampal formation and the core should be synchronized
throughout free exploration, as continually changing states repre-
sented in hippocampus should have a corresponding recruitment
of changing action selection probabilities in the core—just such
an exploration-specific synchronization in local-field potentials
between hippocampus and the core has been reported by Gruber
et al. (2009). More electrophysiological studies will be required
to confirm this hypothesis and precisely identify the underlying
mechanisms.
Recent neurophysiological studies also support the existence
of neural activity consistent with off-line model use for decision-
making in the core. In a multiple T-maze, van der Meer and
Redish (2009) found that neurons in the core which fired at
either reward site also fired at the maze’s decision point, just
where hippocampal activity correlates of forward planning have
been previously found (Johnson and Redish, 2007). Such activity
at decision points occurred before reward was actually experi-
enced, and thus before error correction. This activity appeared
only during initial stages and disappeared after additional train-
ing producing behavioral automation. Such activity could thus
reflect a search process related to the early use of model-based
processes for decision-making by providing signals for the evalua-
tion of internally generated possible transitions considered during
navigation (van der Meer and Redish, 2009).
5.3. VENTRAL STRIATAL SHELL AS CRITIC(S) IN THE MODEL-BUILDER:
ONE SYSTEM AMONGST MANY
More than any other region of the striatum, the ventral stri-
atal shell is a complex intermingling of multiple separate systems
(Humphries and Prescott, 2010), which may include control of
approach and aversive behaviors (Reynolds and Berridge, 2003),
hedonic information, outcome evaluation, memory consolida-
tion, and appetitive control (Kelley, 1999). Consequently, we can-
not meaningfully speak of a role for the shell; not least because,
as we noted in Humphries and Prescott (2010), the lateral and
medial shell are themselves easily distinguished entities in terms
of their afferent and efferent structures—we will return to this
distinction below.
Yin et al. (2008) proposed that the shell’s primary function
is to learn stimulus-outcome associations that drive consumma-
tory behavior. Bornstein and Daw (2011) argued that this role
in consummatory behavior requires a sensitivity to the values
of the outcome, and thus makes the shell a natural candidate
for subserving a role equivalent to the “critic” for the model-
based system. While strictly speaking the actor/critic algorithm
is a model-free system, the model-based system still may rely on
the computation of a prediction error to update the values of
each state (van der Meer and Redish, 2011), whether during off-
line model search or on-line update after each performed action.
Recently, Daw et al. (2011) tested human subjects on amulti-stage
decision task that separated model-based and model-free pre-
diction errors, and found that the model-based prediction error
correlated with the fMRI BOLD signal in VS.
Against this idea, earlier work has shown that the shell appears
not to be required for knowledge of the contingency between
instrumental actions and their outcomes: lesioning the shell does
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not stop devaluation or contingency changes from changing
behavioral choice (Balleine and Killcross, 1994; Corbit et al.,
2001). Consequently, the shell could appear not to be neces-
sary for establishing goal-directed learning—or, by extension,
model-based learning.
However, a closer reading of the lesion studies allows us
to refine that conclusion. In “shell” lesion studies, only the
medial shell is targeted (see, for example, Figure 1 of Corbit
et al., 2001)—not a flaw in experimental design but a limitation
imposed by anatomy, as attempts to lesion the lateral shell would
undoubtedly also damage the overlying lateral core (Ikemoto,
2002). Consequently, the lateral shell remains intact, and is thus
a prime candidate for a model-based critic that leaves the animal
sensitive to outcome devaluation and contingency changes.
Moreover, as we detailed in Humphries and Prescott (2010),
lateral andmedial shell are separable entities: medial shell receives
extensive input from hippocampal field CA1 and subiculum,
while lateral shell receives scant hippocampal input; and both
have separate “direct” and “indirect” pathways through the basal
ganglia to separate populations of midbrain dopaminergic neu-
rons (Figure 5A). As we show in Figures 5B,C, the dual pathways
are a plausible candidate for computing a prediction error based
on comparing the forebrain inputs to the two pathways; con-
sequently both medial and lateral shell could support different
“critic” roles (Humphries and Prescott, 2010).
Which leaves the question of the role of the medial shell, if it is
indeed in a position to compute a prediction error. In Humphries
and Prescott (2010) we proposed the idea that the projections
from hippocampal formation and PFC to the “direct” and “indi-
rect” pathways could, respectively, represent the expected and
achieved state after a transition. Consequently, the medial shell
would be in a position to compute a state prediction error, that
adjusts the transition probability p(s′|s) based on model predic-
tions, rather than on simply counting the occurrences of each
transition.
Lesioning the medial shell would then be predicted to show
subtle deficits in tasks that require building a world model: in suf-
ficiently simple tasks, the mere construction of the links between
a limited number of states, whose values are correctly learnt,
may be sufficient to solve the task and respond to subsequent
changes in the value of those states. Consequently, the intact
sensitivity to devaluation by medial shell-lesioned rats (Balleine
and Killcross, 1994; Corbit et al., 2001) suggests that these were
sufficiently simple tasks. That task complexity is a factor is sug-
gested by the data of Albertin et al. (2000). They trained rats on
a plus-maze on which a currently lit arm-end contained reward
in the form of water drops; each day the rats experienced a new
sequence of lit arms, and each day one of the arms was chosen
to contain six drops and the others contained one drop. A probe
trial was then run in which every arm was lit, allowing the rat
to choose which arm to visit. Albertin et al. (2000) found that
lesioning the medial shell prevented rats from correctly remem-
bering which maze arm contained the high value reward on a
probe trial, but did not impair their ability to learn to visit the
lit arm in the sequence during training. Such a task plausibly
requires each day building anew a world model and querying it on
the probe trial to recall which available state-transition contained
the high reward on that day. If damage to the medial shell pre-
vented correct learning of the transition model, then this would
selectively impair querying of the model, while leaving intact the
FIGURE 5 | Dual pathways from shell to ventral tegmental area (VTA)
potentially support prediction error computation. (A) The medial and
lateral shell both support a dual pathway circuit that converges on
dopaminergic neurons in the VTA: a direct pathway originating from a
population of D1 receptor expressing striatal projection neurons, and an
indirect pathway originating from a mixed population of D1 and D2 receptor
expressing striatal projection neurons [see (Humphries and Prescott, 2010)
for review]. This arrangement is consistent with the shell’s role as a “critic”:
the pathways support the computation of a prediction error between the
prediction transmitted by the direct pathway and the actual outcome
transmitted by the indirect pathway (PPn, pedunculopontine nucleus; VP,
ventral pallidum). (B) Simulation of neural population activity showing how a
greater outcome (indirect pathway) than predicted (direct pathway) drives a
phasic increase in VTA activity, signaling a positive prediction error.
(C) Simulation of neural population activity showing how a lower outcome
(indirect pathway) than predicted (direct pathway) drives a phasic dip in VTA
activity, signaling a negative prediction error. Simulation details given in
Humphries and Prescott (2010).
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 79 | 13
Khamassi and Humphries Model-free/model-based navigation strategies
ability to do simple light-reward association in the model-free
system.
Glascher et al. (2010) searched for correlates of a state pre-
diction error in the fMRI BOLD signal recorded from humans
learning a decision-tree of stimulus choices in the absence of
reward, which was subsequently used as the basis for a rewarded
task. Encouragingly, subjects’ behavior during the learning stage
was well-fit by a reinforcement learning model incorporating a
state prediction error; moreover, the BOLD signal in lateral PFC
and intra-parietal sulcus correlated with the state prediction error
in the model. The equivalent regions in rat are known afferents
of the shell (Uylings et al., 2003; Humphries and Prescott, 2010).
However, they reported that the ventral striatal BOLD signal cor-
related only with the fitted model-free reward prediction error
during the rewarded task stage, and not the state prediction error.
It is not clear, though, whether something computed by a set of
neurons as small as the proposed sub-set in medial shell could be
resolved by the voxel-size used, a problem compounded by the
conservative multiple-comparison corrections used in searching
for BOLD signal correlates.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a functional distinction between
parts of the striatum by bridging data about their respective
involvement in behavioral adaptation taken from both the spatial
navigation literature and the instrumental conditioning litera-
ture. To do so, we have first formally mapped taxonomies of
behavioral strategies from the two literatures to highlight that
navigation strategies could be relevantly categorized as either
model-based or model-free. At root, the key distinction is that it is
the use of information in building a world representation, rather
than the type of information (i.e., place vs. cue), that defines the
different computational processes at stake and their substrates
in the striatum. Within this framework, we explicitly identified
the role for dorsolateral striatum in learning and expression of
model-free strategies, the role of dorsomedial striatum in learn-
ing and expression of model-based strategies, and the role of
“model-builder” for the VS—most probably in conjunction with
the hippocampus (Lansink et al., 2009; van der Meer et al.,
2010; Bornstein and Daw, 2012). Our scheme is summarized in
Figure 6.
FIGURE 6 | Striatal-domain substrates of model-free and model-based
controllers. The proposed organization of navigation strategies and
potential control of learning across the three striatal domains. The
identification of the shell and core as “critics” for the model-based and
model-free controllers in dorsal striatum partly rests on the “spiral” of
striatal-dopamine-striatal projections (Maurin et al., 1999; Haber et al.,
2000; Haber, 2003), originating in the shell of the VS (the spiral is
indicated by the thicker lines) and on the permissive role dopamine plays
in plasticity at cortico-striatal synapses (Reynolds et al., 2001; Shen et al.,
2008). There are also closed loop links between dopamine cell populations
and each striatal region. Abbreviations: Mb, model-based; Mf, model-free;
PPn, pedunculopontine nucleus; SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta; VP,
ventral pallidum; VTA, ventral tegmental area. Note that the “inhibitory”
and “excitatory” labels refer to the dominant neurotransmitter of the
connection, not the effect that connection may have on the target nucleus
as a whole (e.g., basolateral amygdala input to VS neurons can suppress
other excitatory inputs despite using glutamate, which is an “excitatory”
neurotransmitter).
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The hypothesis that two decision-making systems (i.e., model-
based and model-free) are processed in parallel in DMS and
DLS while VS is important for the acquisition of the model
seems to well explain the results of Atallah et al. (2007). In a
forced-choice task in a Y-maze requiring rats to learn the asso-
ciation between two odors and two actions (go left or right),
they found that transient inactivation of DLS 6 did not prevent
a covert learning process which became visible as soon as the
DLS was released. Although this task is typically interpreted as
a habit learning task (van der Meer et al., 2012), the absence
of over-training in the animals—60 trials performed in total—
suggests that model-based learning in the DMS was still playing
an important role at this stage and was unaffected by DLS inac-
tivation. Moreover, Atallah et al. (2007) found that inactivation
of VS mostly impaired acquisition and only partially affected per-
formance, consistent with the proposed role of VS in building the
model used by the model-based system.
6.1. COMPUTATIONS BY THE STRIATUM
Our proposed division of function between different parts of
the striatum preserves the classical hypothesis that striatal ter-
ritories all contribute to behavioral regulation but mainly differ
in function because of their different afferents (Alexander et al.,
1990; Joel and Weiner, 1994; Middleton and Strick, 2000)—a
common division of cortical afferents among the striatal terri-
tories is illustrated in Figure 6. Throughout its dorso-lateral to
ventro-medial extent, the striatum has a consistent micro-circuit
dominated by GABAergic projection neurons controlled by at
least three classes of interneurons (Tepper et al., 2004; Bolam
et al., 2006; Humphries and Prescott, 2010). Such a consistent
micro-architecture points to common operational principles for
how striatum computes with its afferent inputs. Moreover, the
cortex-basal ganglia-thalamus-cortex anatomical loop involving
the ventral striatal core respects the same organization princi-
ples as loops involving the dorsal striatum: thus DLS, DMS, and
VS core are all involved in complete basal ganglia circuits com-
posed of direct and indirect pathways (Humphries and Prescott,
2010). Since numerous computational studies have shown that
this basal ganglia circuitry is efficient for performing a selec-
tion process (Houk and Wise, 1995; Mink, 1996; Redgrave et al.,
1999; Humphries et al., 2006; Leblois et al., 2006; Girard et al.,
2008), it has been proposed that loops involving different striatal
territories could perform different levels of selection influencing
behavior. One such scheme envisions a hierarchy running from
course-grained selection of overall goal or strategy to achieve a
goal, through actions toward a goal, to fine-grained movement
parameters of each action (Redgrave et al., 1999; Ito and Doya,
2011).
6Although the injection site was referred to as the central part of the dorsal
striatum by the authors (see Supplementary Figures 3 and 4 of their original
paper), the great majority of injections were located outside the dorsal stri-
atal region receiving projections from the prelimbic cortex [see Figure 3 in
Voorn et al. (2004)], and thus outside the zone called dorsomedial striatum
and related to goal-directed behaviors and model-based learning [see Figure 1
in Yin et al. (2008) and Figure 1 in Bornstein and Daw (2011)]. Thus, the
injections seem to have mostly reached the dorsolateral striatum related to
model-free habit learning.
The model-based/model-free dichotomy would respect such
a general principle of common selection operation: that striatal
territories receiving state transition information (i.e., p(s′|s) cor-
responding to the probability of transition from state s to state
s′, no matter if these states are spatial or determined by a percep-
tual cue) would be involved in model-based action selection while
striatal territories receiving simple state information (i.e., p(s), no
matter if state s represents a spatial position or the perception of a
stimulus) would be involved in model-free action selection. As we
discussed throughout the text, in contrast to DLS, VS and DMS
receive direct projections from the hippocampal system as well
as medial PFC which place them in a good situation to process
hippocampal state transition information (Gaussier et al., 2002;
Poucet et al., 2004) and hence to participate in the model-based
action selection. Correspondingly, the dominant projections of
sensorimotor cortices to DLSmay thus convey current state infor-
mation, whether originating from the periphery or from higher
cortical areas (Haber, 2003), and hence the DLS participates in
model-free action selection.
6.2. OPEN QUESTIONS
The account here provides concrete proposals for the dorsolat-
eral and dorsomedial striatum’s role in spatial navigation, while
introducing new but comparatively speculative ideas about the
VS’s roles in the model-free and model-based systems. As such,
our account is of course incomplete; so let us conclude with the
primary open questions:
• We have drawn a distinction between place/response strategies
andmodel-based/model-free use of those strategies. To the best
of our knowledge, we lack good evidence for the existence of a
model-free place strategy.
• The observations of a place-to-response strategy shift with
over-training (Dickinson, 1980; Packard and McGaugh, 1996;
Pearce et al., 1998; Chang and Gold, 2003) underpinned the
existing idea that a response strategy is by nature habitual. Our
hypothesis postulates that the central mechanism underlying
all these observed behavioral shifts is a shift from model-
based to model-free rather than from place-based to either
cue-guided or praxic behaviors; but why then is the shift
often (but not always Yin and Knowlton, 2004; Botreau and
Gisquet-Verrier, 2010) from model-based place to model-free
response?
• What is anterior DMS doing? Ragozzino and Choi (2004) pro-
posed a role for it in strategy selection, as lesions caused a
selective deficit in reversal learning, but not in initial acquisi-
tion. Alternatively, perhaps DMS is divided into sub-territories
differentially involved in place, cue, and praxic model-based
systems.
• Lesion data on the core provide conflicting accounts of its
roles. For example, the results of Corbit et al. (2001) dis-
agree with evaluation: for why, if the core forms part of the
transition model, does lesioning it not then prevent outcome
devaluation from affecting behavior? By contrast, McDannald
et al. (2011) found that lesions of core affected responding
to both changes in outcome value and changes in outcome
identity, emphasizing its involvement in model-based learning.
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Fromour account, it is not surprising that conflicting data arise
if core lesions interfere with both evaluative and action selec-
tion systems; however, it is not clear what task designs would
be sufficient to tease apart the selective effects of core lesions
on its evaluative and action selection roles.
• Do the striatal domains underpin a common computation?
Our focus has been on the algorithmic-level distinctions
between behavioral strategies, and the striatal substrates within
the neural systems implementing those algorithms. As noted
throughout, this computation may be action selection: the
resolution of competing inputs at the striatal level into one
(or a few) selected signals at the output of the basal gan-
glia. Based on our proposals here, we may speculate that
these selections are based on different representations of the
world.
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